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Documents Diplomatiques Suisses. Vol. 22: 1.VII.1961–31.XII.1963, ed. Antoine 
Fleury and Mauro Cerutti (Zurich: Chronos Verlag, 2009; pp. lvi + 462. 
SFr. 78).
This is the seventh volume of the post-war series of the Documents Diplomatiques 
Suisses, the Swiss equivalent of the Documents on British Policy Overseas or the 
Foreign Relations of the United States series. It covers the period between 1 July 
1961 and 31 December 1963, which witnessed a further escalation of the Cold 
War and the inauguration of a new era in Swiss foreign policy under the 
stewardship of Friedrich Traugott Wahlen. A member of the now defunct Party 
of Farmers, Traders and Independents, he enjoyed great popularity for 
increasing Switzerland’s self-sufficiency in food supplies during the Second 
World War, and had, as an agronomist, gained high-level international 
experience within the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization. This, together 
with his previous government service, provided him with the necessary political 
weight to succeed the liberal Max Petitpierre, who had shaped Switzerland’s 
foreign relations for sixteen years, in the Federal Political Department. In 
office, he benefited from co-operation with Hans Schaffner, the mastermind of 
Swiss post-war commercial relations, who had taken over the Federal 
Department of Public Economy. This co-operation, as Antoine Fleury so 
rightly points out in the introduction, was crucial in the conduct of foreign 
affairs (p. xix), and should be borne in mind by those scholars of Swiss foreign 
policy who neglect economics.
The documents, which stem from the Swiss Federal Archives, are presented in 
chronological order, but have been selected according to seven themes. The first 
(and from Berne’s perspective the most important) is European integration. The 
British decision to start negotiations on European Economic Community (EEC) 
membership took the neutral Swiss by surprise. It seemed as if they had lost, at 
one blow, their most potent ally in the fight against European political integration 
and a co-founder of the European Free Trade Association. Whereas some in the 
Federal Council felt betrayed, others saw in Britain a future advocate for the 
neutrals inside the EEC (pp. 67–8). Yet there emerged the consensus that 
Switzerland had to pursue—in consultation with the other neutrals (Austria and 
Sweden)—a middle course leading to an association with the Six. Although de 
Gaulle’s veto on British membership made the issue less urgent, it was clear for 
Swiss policy-makers that neutrality forbade them to join the EEC.
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The policy of neutrality also influenced decision-making in most of the 
other areas covered here. In economic and technical co-operation with 
developing countries, Switzerland acted on a bilateral and a multilateral level. 
Yet it preferred to provide aid bilaterally, in order to avoid being drawn through 
international organisations into Moscow’s and Washington’s global Cold 
War. This position accounted also for Berne’s relations with international 
organisations and its reluctance to respond favourably to requests for financial 
support by the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. If, despite this 
reluctance, Switzerland was still willing to pay, this was in order to show its 
solidarity with the world and thereby improve the image of neutrality. The 
major boon to neutrality was, however, Berne’s good offices and humanitarian 
activities. It was thanks to this intermediary role that the two super-powers 
came to realise the diplomatic utility of neutrality, and Swiss diplomats were 
propelled into the heart of international tensions in Algeria, Cuba and other 
theatres. This function of neutrality certainly compensated for Switzerland’s 
ambivalent foreign and domestic security policy.
In line with their armed neutrality, the Swiss aimed at an autonomous 
defence, and for this they even wanted to keep the option of a Swiss nuclear 
deterrent open (p. 379). But their security outlook nevertheless remained 
western-oriented. They were willing to co-operate in the intelligence field with 
the western powers (p. 213), and to keep Spanish workers under surveillance—
not least to please Franco (p. 36). Even though Switzerland tried to uphold the 
credibility and respectability of its neutrality by ostensibly not choosing sides, 
and believed that it acted as an example for third-world countries, it remained 
on the western side of the Iron Curtain. This attitude could even influence 
development aid, which had a western bias and was sometimes seen as ‘a 
contribution in the fight against communism’ (p. 116). This aid was not only 
driven by ideals and altruism, but was also seen as a means to win new markets. 
Economic considerations remained a dominant factor in Swiss foreign policy, 
and can be most clearly observed in Switzerland’s commercial and financial 
relations, and in its policy on migration. The documents in these two themes 
are of contemporary relevance, for they relate to Switzerland’s banking and 
taxation practices, as well as to economic, domestic and international pressures 
on immigration. Accordingly, this volume has the potential to fulfil the editors’ 
aim to be a source for both scholars and practitioners of Swiss foreign policy 
(p. vii).
However, the choice of documents and themes has imposed limitations. 
Switzerland’s security and defence policy is not sufficiently covered. During the 
early Cold War, the Swiss entertained defence and armament relations with 
Britain, France and the US. But, in contrast to previous volumes, these 
neutrality-compromising relationships are absent here. Instead, the editors 
seem to have over-emphasised Switzerland’s relations with newly-independent 
states in Africa and Asia. Although this is in line with recent Cold War 
scholarship, the documents often lack substance and are limited to courtesy 
visits and modest development aid. Meanwhile, the absence of cultural and 
scientific diplomacy is marked. Yet these are pardonable lacunae, since the 
book is a stepping-stone to a wealth of documents on many more themes in the 
database accessible through the online platform of the Documents Diplomatiques 
Suisses (www.dodis.ch). Thanks to an excellent search engine, cross-references, 
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thematic dossiers and registers, this database provides free access to the world 
of Switzerland’s foreign relations.
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